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PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE 1970s
ROGER HANDBERG
University of Central Florida
WILLIAM S. MADDOX
University of New Orleans

In the 1960s, Murphy and Tanenhaus examined the linkages between public opinion and
the U.S. Supreme Court. This article represents a new look at that question within the
context of the 1970s, using national survey data. Four clusters of explanations are
developed, based upon the previous literature, and tested, using trust in the Court as the
dependent vanable. The two most important explanatory variables found are race and
education, but race is declining as an explanation for variations in support for the Court.

Where does the U.S. Supreme Court draw its support within the
general public? This simple question poses a dilemma for the
investigator because the relationship of the Court to American
public opinion has usually been characterized as a murky one.
Generally, the Court has very low salience for members of the

general public. Relatively few citizens can identify a present
Court justice or recall with any great precision specific policy
decisions. Consequently, much of the research in this area has
focused on relevant attentive publics such as attorneys, lower
court judges (federal and state), legislators, and police officers
(Sheldon, 1974: 186-199). Alternatively , the focus of analysis has
been on limited statewide samples that may not be generalizable
(Casey, 1976). As a result of this shift in emphasis, relatively little
attention has been paid to the general public and changes that
may have occurred. This article is an attempt to identify within the
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of the 1970s those groups supportive of the Court and to
reexamine some explanations of public support developed by
Murphy and Tanenhaus (1968a, 1968b; Murphy et al., 1973).
Thus, we seek to tie together diverse explanations and provide a
longitudinal perspective to the earlier findings.
context

EARLIER WORK

Four related clusters of hypotheses have been proposed as
explanations for variations in levels of public support for the
Court. These four can be loosely labeled (1) a partisanshipideological cluster, (2) a social groupings cluster, (3) a specific
policy outcomes cluster, and (4) a diffuse political support cluster.
From the labels alone, one could predict a substantial degree of
overlap in terms of analytic categories.
The partisanship-ideological cluster of hypotheses is taken first
because it has the greatest intuitive appeal and empirical support,
based on public perceptions of the Court as a political institution.
Essentially, this hypothesis is that support for the Court as an
institution is determined by one’s preexisting partisanship or
ideological proclivities (Kessel, 1966; Dolbeare and Hammond,
1968). A Court perceived as dominated by the appointees of one
political party will be rejected by adherents of the opposing party.
For example, the Roosevelt Court, by that very characterization,
provided a cue to partisans of both political parties. Such a
strictly partisanship-based argument was found to be of little
merit in the 1960s by Murphy et al. (1973: 49; Murphy and
Tanenhaus, 1972: 207). A more satisfying result was found when
they concentrated strictly on general political ideology rather
than on partisanship (Murphy et al., 1973: 47-49; Tanenhaus and
Murphy, 1981: 36). For example, individuals who are liberal will
support a Court that they perceive as liberal and reject one that
essentially is out of harmony with their ideological views.
Based on this earlier work, then, there clearly is the possibility
that support for the Court can be explained by some combination
of political ideology and partisanship. Generally, ideological
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leaning has been found to have greater explanatory power than
partisanship, especially in samples drawn from a single state
(Casey, 1976: 21, 28; Lehne and Reynolds, 1978: 901-902). Also,
Tanenhaus and Murphy reported in 1981 on the results of a panel
study of the earlier 1966 sample. Using the &dquo;culled sample&dquo; as the
sampling universe, they reinterviewed 381 of the original respondents in 1975. Generally, they found the patterns of the 1960s
essentially unchanged. Party identification continued to be of
little value in explaining variations in support for the Court, while
political ideology was a major factor (1981: 38). One difficulty
with the panel study is that it effectively eliminates a political
generation from the analysis: those who came to political
maturity in a time when the Court was the subject of intense
political controversy. Also, by reinterviewing only the knowledgeables, the real changes may have been missed. The less
knowledgeable may be the most susceptible to change, since they
have the greatest deficits in terms of information and evaluation.
Therefore, the Tanenhaus and Murphy results may still be an
artifact of the 1960s. The 1970s raise a particularly interesting
situation, since the Court itself was characterized by many as the
Nixon Court, while the 1960s Court was never labeled as the
Kennedy/Johnson Court.
The second cluster of explanations identifies certain groups in
society as especially supportive of the Court. The explanation is
basically that of self-interest. The Court has provided a particular
group with some benefits or &dquo;moral victories&dquo; that create a sense
of attachment to the Court as an institution. The only group that
clearly has qualified under this rubric have been Black Americans. The earlier 1964 and 1966 surveys found that Black
Americans were especially supportive of the Court, reportedly in
response to the school desegregation and other civil rights issues
decided by the Court (Murphy and Tanenhaus, 1968a: 372;
Murphy et al., 1973: 21-22). No other social group was clearly as
supportive as this particular one. By contrast, whites (especially
southerners) were hostile to the Court, an almost mirror reversal
of Black support for the Court. Although southern white hostility
was not as strong as the support found among Blacks, it did
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depress the general white support levels for the Court (Hirsch and
Donohew, 1968: 559).
The third cluster, a specific policy outcomes cluster, suggests
that people will be more supportive of an institution that protects
or extends their interests. The difficulty is in disentangling the
effects of demographic variables on specific policy measures.
Generally, the converse occurs: Critics of Court policies are apt to
be the most informed about what the Court does but are also least
supportive of the Court as an institution. To know what the Court
specifically does (such as make particular policy decisions) is
often to dislike it (Murphy et al., 1973: 46-47). Thus, the specific
policy outcomes hypothesis has been a relatively weak explanation of public opinion about the Court. The result (according to
the earlier studies) is that the &dquo;winners&dquo; (except, apparently,
Blacks) before the Court may not be aware they have &dquo;won.&dquo; In
fact, the more cogent expositions of this view hold that the groups
that &dquo;really&dquo; win are the economic elites, whc are a miniscule
segment of the population. Therefore, the &dquo;winners&dquo;’ views on the
subject get washed in the sea of apathy that often surrounds Court
pronouncements on major substantive policy issues.
Part of this conceptual difficulty also may be explainable in
terms of education levels and partisanship during the 1960s. The
legacy of the Warren Court was an expansion of opportunities for
&dquo;underdogs&dquo; within society. The more educated segments of
society, however, tended to be Republican-those most likely to
be hostile to the resulting policy outcomes. This particular
configuration clearly may be a function of the specific historical
era within which the earlier research took place; that is, an
assertive liberal Court existed in the 1960s, an historically
unusual event.
The final cluster, a diffuse political support cluster, was
considered by Murphy and Tanenhaus (1968a) as an aspect of
regime legitimation. The difficulty with this hypothesis has been
the continuing problem of low visibility of the Court as an
institution. It is difficult to speak of the legitimating power of an
institution that is essentially invisible to most of the populace
(Casey, 1974). The Court, like other political institutions, is
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subject to the vagaries of the secular trend. As general support for
political institutions declines, support for the Court also slowly
declines. The difference in rate of change may reflect a reverence
for the Court or instead be another indicator of the Court’s
invisibility to the general public (Kessel, 1966).

RESEARCH DESIGN

This article attempts to reexamine these four clusters within the
limitations of the Center for Political Studies’ data sets. A major
limitation of the data historically has been the myopia with which
the political system is approached. Political party and voting
behavior is primary, while other political institutions, such as the
presidency or Congress, are seen essentially through the prism of
the political party. Therefore, the measures reported here are at
best approximations rather than constructs developed to answer
the specific questions posed within this article.
This analysis is based on national surveys conducted in 1972,
1974, and 1976 by the Center for Political Studies. The dependent
variable is level of trust in the Supreme Court. Trust in the Court
was chosen for two reasons, one theoretical and one practical.
The latter is a function of these particular data sets-no other
comparable question exists across the three time periods to aid us
in assessing change. Theoretically, trust in the Court represents a
consensual opinion response-one that even individuals with low
information levels can make. Given the generally low levels of
knowledge about the Court among the public, such an approach
expands the groups under consideration and, of course, also
makes the likelihood of weak findings greater.
The trust question is a comparative question. The respondents
were asked, &dquo;Which part of the government on the list do you
most often trust to do what’s right?&dquo; For 1972, the results were
Congress, 28%; Supreme Court, 22%; President, 36%; and
political parties, 1%. In 1974, the percentages were Congress, 22%;
Supreme Court, 42%; President, 18%; and political parties, 2%.
Finally, in 1976, the totals were Congress, 23%; Supreme Court,
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32%; President, 24%; and political parties, 2%. We treated the
for the trust questions as an ordinal measure of trust in the
Court: Respondents could rank the Court as first through fourth
in trustworthiness. In 1974 and 1976, two additional questions
were asked concerning how good a job the Court was doing and
how much influence the Court should have. The correlations
between those questions and the trust questions were positive and
in the .27 to .56 range. These correlations indicate that trust in the
Court is part of a generally supportive view of the Court and its
work.
In order to test the hypotheses, we chose several variables that
are theoretically related to the underlying concepts. For the
partisan-ideological cluster, the variables chosen consisted of
score

party identification (tricotomized into Democrat, Independent,

Republican, with independent leaners included as independents), ideology (tricotomized into liberal [1,2,3] moderate
[4], conservative [5,6,7]), and reports of attitudes toward President Nixon, measured by the standard CPS feeling thermomand

eter.

The specific policy outcomes and special groups hypotheses
have been merged together in the analyses because, despite the
conceptual clarity of the two hypotheses, the available operationalizations are not as clearly distinct as one might expect.
Therefore, the variables selected reflect this amalgam. The
variables that most explicitly represent the earlier work are race

(coded as white/ nonwhite), education (grade school, high school,
some college, or more), and region (South/Nonsouth). Income
and religion also have direct policy significance because of the
Court’s decisions in the late 1960s and 1970s on poverty as a
on the abortion issue. Sex became
because
of
women’s
rights issues, while race relates to
important
the Court’s work on rights of the accused, busing, and affirmative
action. In any of these instances, one could conceptualize the
Court’s work in terms of &dquo;winners and losers.&dquo; In fact, the issue
cluster includes questions on busing, rights of the accused,
abortion (1972 and 1976 only), and the Nixon resignation (1974
only). Busing, abortion, and rights of the accused are issues of

&dquo;suspect category&dquo; and
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relevance to the Court, since the Court has been in the
forefront of those issues over the past two decades. The abortion
issue has become important since 1973. The Nixon resignation
was an event that the Court, by its decision in U. S. v. Nixon
(1974), made almost inevitable. Therefore, approval or disapproval of the resignation might prove to be an important force in
determining levels of trust in the Court.
The diffuse political support hypothesis cannot be directly
considered with the variables in these surveys. What we do have
are psychological variables that are partial markers of the
concepts embedded in the notion of diffuse political support. We
include in this grouping political efficacy (a four-point scale),

particular

political trust (a five-point scale), political interest (a high/low
dichotomy), and patterns of attention to media (for the latter two
surveys only). Most earlier studies have not focused on these
variables to any significant degree. The major exception was the
Murphy and Tanenhaus paper dealing with the Court’s legitimation function, although very little was done with efficacy
because the basic pattern was washed out by education (1968a:
366-368). Casey, in his Missouri survey, also referred to exposure
political information but dealt only with newspaper reading
habits (1976: 18).
to

ANALYSIS

In Table 1, we present the correlations between level of trust in
the Court and the various variable clusters. Among the social
variables, education, age, and sex are the most strongly related to
trust in the Court. The race variable reverses over the four-year
span-possibly reflecting Black America’s increasing awareness
that the Court was no longer the active defender of minority
rights it had been in the Warren era.
The partisan explanations do not hold up, except for the
evaluations made of President Nixon. The 1972 and 1976
rankings are consistent with expectations: Trust in the Court is
negatively correlated with positive evaluations of Nixon. A large
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TABLE 1

Relationship

NA - not

Between Selected Variables and Trust
in the Court (gammas)

applicable.

number of nonresponses to that question in 1974 effectively
reverses the relationship by overrepresenting the number of his
supporters. Nixon’s ratings can be conceptualized as period
effects similar to the results found in the 1960s with Barry
Goldwater (Murphy and Tanenhaus, 1968a). Among the psychological variables, political efficacy has the most consistent
relationship. Among the issue questions, only abortion appears
to have a moderate and continuing relationship to attitudes
toward the Court. Supporters of the Court are disproportionately
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TABLE 2

Relationship Between Selected Variables and Trust

in Court,

Controlling for Level of Education

*Grade school, high school, and college.

drawn from the ranks of abortion advocates even prior to the
rulings on the topic in 1973. The busing issue did not maintain its
position as a significant determinant of attitudes toward the
Court, reflecting the localized and episodic nature of the issue.
Given that education is often an important factor in explaining
variations in political views and activity levels, a control for
education was introduced to see if the relationships reported in
Table I were explainable in terms of differences in educational
level (see Table 2). When one controls for level of education, the
social variables’ correlations are reduced, indicating that education and its concomitant attributes are an important explanation
for differences in trust levels. This pattern is especially true as
regards the influence of income, age, and sex on trust levels. For
the other variable cluster, the pattern is more mixed, though
generally in the direction of reducing correlations. Among the
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the pattern
reversed in that the less educated group had a higher trust
level compared to the more educated respondents. Among the
issue questions, more educated respondents were much more
inclined to support busing and abortion than their less educated

psychological variables, especially political interest,
was

compatriots.
Given that educational differences helped explain a portion of
the trust variable, the analysis now moves to a more generalized
model of the problem. Here we take a two-stage approach. Since
race was an important variable in determing levels of support for
the Court in the 1960s and that variable’s contribution to
explaining differences in trust levels is high at least until 1972, we
constructed a regression model in which a control is imposed on
race. In effect, race was held constant and the patterns within the
two groups, whites and nonwhites, were examined. Second, we
constructed a simplified model and applied it to all three surveys,
using all respondents regardless of race.
The variables used in the multiple regression analyses are
reported in Table 3 and are drawn from those variables reported
in Table 1. In effect, we have controlled for both race and
education, since the variables used are those least affected by the
education control reported in Table 2. Theoretically, these
variables represent an explicit test of the ideological preferences
and specific benefits hypotheses within the context of two very
diverse populations. Nonwhites, in the past, represented the one
major source of evidence for the specific benefits hypothesis.
None of the reported results is overpowering in terms of R22
values, but what does appear consistently is the importance of the
education variables in explaining differences in levels of trust in
the Court. In addition, we note the apparently declining impact of
party identification upon levels of trust in the Court, especially
among white respondents. The relationship of ideology to trust is
also a declining one. This decline may reflect the fact that the
Court has become more obscure and its image more ambiguous in
terms of policy content. The policy questions have very little
explanatory power (except for busing) for the nonwhite respondents. Republicans and conservatives have been neutralized
as a source of criticism because of the five Republican presidential
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TABLE 3

Multiple Regression of Trust in the Court on Selected
Variables, Controlling for Race (betas)

Court appointees, while liberal Democrats may be mollified by
the Court’s relatively moderate decisions in certain highly visible

notably abortion.
the analysis reported in Table 3, a simplified
model
was attempted. Four independent variables
generalized
were selected for inclusion into the model: race, education, party
identification, and political ideology. Each was found to be
theoretically and empirically important in earlier work on the
Court in the 1960s and also was found to have some importance in
our analysis of the 1970s reported here. The model used there
reflects an amalgamation of the specific benefits and partisanideological hypotheses, and attempts to explain public opinion
policy

areas,

Based

on

toward the Court

across

two

decades.
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TABLE 4

Multiple Regression of Trust in the Court on Four
General Model Variables (betas)

Table 4 summarizes the multiple regression results across the
three surveys. This basic model explains less of the variance than
does the collection of variables in Table 3, but it does highlight the
changing levels of importance of time for the major explanatory
variables. It also provides more obvious evidence for the
alternative hypotheses regarding sources of support for the
Court. Education remains stable as a predictor, while race,
another social grouping variable, declines in importance. The two
variables representing the partisan-ideological hypothesis are of
little importance in these findings. The diffuse support hypothesis
is not represented in this model, because none of the substitute
measures of diffuse support were of any value in the earlier stages
of the analysis. A regression analysis (not reported here) including political efficacy, the diffuse support measure most
consistently correlated with trust in the Court, showed virtually
no additional variance explained. We must note that the failure of
other hypotheses to explain support for the Court could suggest
inferential support for the diffuse support hypotheses, as it could
be considered a &dquo;residual&dquo; kind of explanation.

DISCUSSION

Analysis of public evaluations of the Court is a difficult process
because of the paucity of information held by the public about the
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are able to evaluate the Court at least along the
simplistic dimensions inherent in the concept of trust in the
Court. The difficulty is that no simple set of variables appears to
explain variations in evaluations. This failure to explain can be
attributed to two factors: (1) failure of the surveys to ask
theoretically relevant questions, and (2) the apparent collapse of
historically significant variables, such as party identification, that
earlier structured citizen perceptions of the political system and,
by extension, the Court (Dolbeare and Hammond, 1968).
In fact, the two most important explanatory variables are race
and education. Race appears significant primarily as a carryover
from the earlier Warren Court era, when a generation of
nonwhites were socialized into a positive perception of the Court
as the protector of minority rights. By 1976, that perception was
no longer as clear. Additional evidence for this shift in attitudes
among nonwhites can be drawn from an analysis of the Social
Surveys. Sigelman (1979) found Black support of the Court to
have declined but, unfortunately, his method of analysis made it
impossible to identify when the shift occurred. Education continues as a strong explanatory variable because of the whole
complex of attributes that correlate to education: income,
political interest, and information. As a result, the educated can
observe and assess the Court with at least a more generalized

Court. Citizens

frame of reference than can the uneducated.
At this stage in the research, what we have is an educational
differences model of evaluations of the Court. Referring back to
Table 3, one can observe there that the variable configurations,
while similar, do contain significant differences. The primary
similarity is the impact of education on trust levels. Support for
the Court is also a function of race, which reflects differences in
perceived benefits, represented in the 1970s by busing and
abortion issues. Education, however, is an important factor for
both, and its total impact over time appears to be increasing as the
other structuring variables decline in relative importance.
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